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The last ten to fifteen years have seen a proliferation of philosophical 
manuscripts and chapters in English concerning Confucian ethics. Some of 
these have an overtly historical/textual approach, while others are explicitly 
comparative (often between Confucius 孔子 or Mencius 孟子 and Aristotle), 
and some seek to put ideas from the classical period into conversation with 
issues in contemporary ethics. Some projects begin from within a more 
“analytic” orientation, while still others identify themselves as belonging to 
the “continental” tradition. Theorists have argued that Confucian ethics is 
best understood as a species of deontology, as a distinctive form of virtue 
ethics, and as care ethics, to name a few. The project of trying to figure out 
the best already- present Western category to use for Confucian ethics is one 
that has occupied a great deal of time and effort in contemporary circles, and 
which may, as Stephen Angle has argued, be an example of the “unhealthy 
hegemony” of Western frameworks in comparative or cross- cultural 
philosophy.1 As I see it, the project of Confucian Role Ethics (CRE), however, 
is not trying to intervene in that discourse. While Roger Ames and others use 
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some non-Confucian thinkers in articulating CRE, the project itself is trying 
to set up Confucian ethics as a distinct category of its own, on par with, but 
not subsumed under, other ethical traditions.
Ames opens his monograph by suggesting that CRE and its commitment 
to growth in personal relationships should not be understood solely as an 
historical artifact, but as a meaningful participant in contemporary ethical 
discourse. In the Introduction to Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary Ames 
writes:
The contention of this monograph then, is that we are entering upon a 
transitional period of enormous proportions with the imminent emergence 
of a new cultural order, and that Confucianism offers us philosophical 
assets that can be resourced and applied to serve not only the renaissance 
of a revitalized Chinese culture, but also the interests of world culture 
more broadly.2
That is, Ames is arguing for what Kam-Por yu, Julia Tao, and Philip J. Ivanhoe 
have called taking Confucian ethics seriously—this means that one does not 
“see it simply as something East Asian or Confucian; to take Confucian 
ethics seriously is to be concerned with the contemporary philosophical 
relevance of the Confucian tradition.”3 CRE adds to this that taking 
Confucian ethics seriously in a philosophical sense also requires taking it first 
and foremost on its own terms, which requires rethinking and retranslating 
much of the content of early Confucian texts, as their early reception in the 
western world was filtered through some decidedly distortive sources. While 
Ames may be the most famous current proponent of Confucian Role Ethics, 
this interpretation of Confucianism is situated in an intellectual lineage that 
owes much to earlier interpreters such as Zhang Dongsun 張東蓀 (1886–
1973) and Tang Junyi 唐君毅 (1909–78), and which continues in the work 
of scholars such as Henry Rosemont, Jr., A.T. Nuyen, WEN Haiming, John 
Ramsey, and others.4
Many contemporary accounts of Confucian ethics focus heavily on the 
classical texts, especially the Analects 論語 and the Mengzi 孟子, although 
some do include and/or focus on other texts. Most accounts share certain 
features such as the central place of the family and the importance of 
relationships, the need for a strong connection to and contribution to 
tradition, an understanding of ethical life as inherently political, and the 
demonstration of ethical cultivation through ritual proficiency, to name a 
few. CRE also shares these features, but it takes them in what I call elsewhere 
a “radically relational direction,” putting correlative cosmology and relational 
personhood at the nexus of the interpretive framework.5
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When we speak of a _______ ethic(s), an x ethics, we take that to be a 
theory of ethics that focuses on x, takes x as a central concept or concern. 
Confucian Role Ethics, then, is an account of ethics drawn from Confucian 
traditions that takes human persons as irreducibly relational and human lives 
as flourishing in and through familial, social, and political roles.6 Ames writes, 
“At the very heart of Confucian role ethics, distinguishing it fundamentally 
from more familiar Western ethical ‘theories,’ is a concept of a relationally 
constituted person who realizes a vision of the consummate life through a 
kind of moral artistry.”7
I see at least three sets of concerns that animate the reasoning behind 
Confucian role ethics: naming, translation, and interpretation. In terms of 
naming, I discuss this project as an example of zhengming 正名, or proper 
naming, which is a common Confucian ethical project. Confucian thinkers 
are often preoccupied with appropriate categorization, one species of which 
is naming. The naming of Confucian ethics as role ethics, I argue, is not only 
consistent with but is situated in a larger Confucian concern with appropriate 
names. In terms of translation, I explore CRE in conversation with the 
translation theory of Lawrence Venuti, who argues against translations of 
“fluency” for an anti- domestication strategy—a method for translations to 
maintain some level of “foreignness.” Finally, I engage certain hermeneutic 
and interpretive assumptions about the very project of coming to understand 
“Confucian” ethics at all. In doing so, I also provide certain critical reflections 
on “role ethics” as a way of understanding Confucianism.
NAMING
In Confucian traditions, names matter. One way to understand the project of 
Confucian role ethics is as an example of zhengming 正名, or proper naming, 
which is a common Confucian ethical project, and an inherently political 
project. Confucian thinkers are often preoccupied with language and 
appropriate categorization, one species of which is naming.
While the phrase zhengming itself only appears once in the Analects 
(although proper naming is a concern of other passages), and not at all in the 
Mengzi, it is the subject of an entire chapter of the Xunzi, and is incorporated 
into Confucian concerns as the tradition moves forward. The most often- 
cited passages in the Analects having to do with proper naming are 12.11, 
13.3, and 13.6, although as nearly every commentator on early Confucianism 
remarks, the key terms “ren” and “li” (along with others) are in a constant 
process of definition and refining, as Confucius takes these terms up in new 
and innovatively philosophical directions—so the concern with naming roles, 
relationships, and ideals is present through much of the text. In addition, the 
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context of the text, and of early Confucianism, as a product of the situations 
of the pre-Qin Warring States period, suggest that the name of a person or a 
role is especially important for what that person is expected to do and how 
that person is expected to behave.
In 12.11, when asked by the Duke of Qi about zheng 政, effective governing, 
Confucius replies: “君君, 臣臣, 父父, 子子。”8 In his reply, Confucius uses the 
reduplicative function of nouns to emphasize the already present moral 
dimension of the roles of ruler, minister, father, and child. In saying that the 
ruler should rule, the minister minister, the father father, and the child child, he 
directs the Duke’s attention to the fact that these key political and family roles 
and relationships are inherently normative, and as such require regular tune- 
ups to be attuned properly. To be appropriately called a ruler, certain practices, 
attitudes, activities, and behaviors are expected, and one who does not act/live 
in accordance with these should not be called a ruler. The tuning standard for 
Confucius was the flourishing of the Zhou Dynasty, but his project, as I argue 
elsewhere, is not simply retrospective: “it is an hermeneutic process of attuning 
names, of proper naming, intersecting past meanings, present circumstances, 
and future possibilities.”9 That is, although for Confucius the standard was the 
Zhou, we need not understand zhengming as limited to the Zhou specifically, 
but we can see the activity of proper naming as responding to effective 
configurations, as Confucius understood the Zhou to be.
In 13.3, we see Confucius claim that his first priority of state leadership 
would be zhengming. Although Zilu is concerned that this would be 
impractical, Confucius argues that this is, in fact, the lynchpin of ethico- 
political success, upon which speech, matters of state, ritual proficiency, the 
playing of music, the application of standards, laws, and punishments, and 
the understanding of the people’s daily purpose depend.10 I have argued 
elsewhere that the naming of Confucian ethics as role ethics is an instance of 
zhengming, of the project of attuning names.
Thus, the naming of Confucian ethics as “role ethics” points to the three 
directional movements of the process of zhengming. First, in attempting to 
be as faithful as possible to the tradition itself, it is incorporating past 
meanings and insights, while being sensitive to the often unconscious foisting 
of prejudices onto another tradition. Second, it recognizes the current 
philosophical landscape and, in seeking to properly contextualize Confucian 
ethics, negotiates with contemporary scholarship. Finally, it is not solely a 
scholarly move. Rosemont and Ames find insights in this tradition that have 
applicability now and for aiding in the process of intelligent deliberation 
regarding future possibilities. As such, Confucian role ethics is itself an 
instance of zhengming.11
*
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The naming of Confucian ethics as role ethics, I argue, is not only consistent 
with but is situated in a larger Confucian concern with appropriate names. 
Names, in Classical Confucianism, are understood as real, important, useful, 
efficacious, but also as provisional, temporary, adjustable, and negotiable. 
Because naming is not merely a descriptive act, but an inherently normative 
one, the negotiation of names also carries with it a negotiation of both 
activity and expectation. Calling Confucian ethics “role ethics” implies a 
particular set of practices and a particular set of expectations, and these 
particulars are different from other ways of naming Confucian ethics.
In Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary, Ames argues that family is 
understood as the governing metaphor in Confucianism. Playing with the 
term lun 倫, Ames describes lun (human roles, living one’s roles and relations) 
as part of a cluster of cognate “lun’s,” the intersections of which are helpful 
for making sense of the radial order made possible through and demonstrated 
in family relations. He writes:
When we bring these various associations of this family of characters 
together, the insight gleaned is that the perceived source of growing 
proper “relations” is fundamentally discursive: an aggregating ‘relating to’ 
and “giving an account of oneself ” within the compass of one’s roles that 
define family, and by extension, community. Simply put, a thriving family- 
based community derives from continuing familial patterns of effective 
communicating [. . .] Family roles as a strategy for getting the most out of 
relations are thus an inspiration for order more broadly construed—social, 
political, and cosmic order. We might say that Confucianism is nothing 
more than a sustained attempt “to family” the lived human experience. 
For Confucianism, it is through discursive living in a communicating 
family and community that we are able to enchant the ordinary, to ritualize 
the routine, to invigorate the familiar, to inspire the customary habits of 
life, and ultimately, to commune spiritually in the common and the 
everyday.12
In naming Confucian ethics as role ethics, then, the “role” not only brings 
in connotations from the Chinese terminology, but from the kinds of 
concerns that animate this interpretation. Roles are the radial center of this 
vision of prescriptive ethics, from which all activities and concerns both 
begin and come to completion. It also acts as a kind of categorization—
naming, in Classical Chinese, is less connected with a kind of vertical concept 
subsumption than with a more horizontal project of categorization—and the 
naming of Confucian ethics as role ethics marks out a distinct category in the 
larger field of ethics.
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TRANSLATING
As not simply a descriptive move, the normative side of naming Confucian 
ethics as role ethics concerns activity and expectation—how do we understand 
the key features of personal, familial, and political cultivation in a Confucian 
context? The re- naming thus entails re- translating and re- articulating with 
the same intersection of past, present, and future.
One of the consistent criticisms Ames especially has received from others 
in the sinological/philosophical community has been in the form of concerns 
about translation. This is a long- standing issue, and is not limited to his work 
on CRE. However, as a central component of the work in CRE has to do 
with translation, thinking about some of the second- order issues with 
translation seems appropriate.
One of the consistent features of Ames’ work is a concern with translation 
that does not replace the ambient assumptions and background cosmology 
of classical China with either broadly western/Abrahamic or contemporary 
frameworks. This often requires extended discussions of metaphysics (or 
what Ames and Zhang call “cosmology”13) in the context of parsing certain 
translations. It also often requires stretching the bounds of common English 
in ways that visibly depart from more traditional translations—think here 
of the difference between “benevolence” and “consummate personhood” as 
translations for ren 仁.
While Ames explains this in terms of attention to the original language, 
context, and commentaries, I would like to suggest an additional way of 
thinking about the value of efforts to translate, and so to interpret, that may go 
against the grain of the target language or audience. In Lawrence Venuti’s book, 
The Translator’s Invisibility, he critically examines translation practices (into 
English) from the seventeenth century to today. He demonstrates that fluency, 
often taken for granted as an obviously desirable translation strategy, is in fact 
one of many strategies, and he shows how it was that fluency came to be prized 
over other translation strategies in English. He does this in the context of 
arguing that certain ethnocentric and culturally imperialistic values are imposed 
on foreign texts during the process of translating for “fluency.” In this section, 
I explore the idea of understanding Confucian role ethics as a translation 
project, as what Venuti calls “resistancy”, or “foreignizing translation.”14
Venuti begins his project by thinking through his title phrase, the 
invisibility of the translator. By prioritizing fluency in terms of translation, 
the translator has become “invisible” in two ways; first she is invisible in 
terms of her manipulation of English, and second, the fact of her translation 
is made invisible through what Venuti calls the “illusion of transparency,” 
where the translation gives the effect of reading the original:
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The illusion of transparency is an effect of fluent discourse, of the 
translator’s effort to insure easy readability by adhering to current usage, 
maintaining continuous syntax, fixing a precise meaning. What is so 
remarkable here is that this illusory effect conceals the numerous conditions 
under which the translation is made, starting with the translator’s crucial 
intervention in the foreign text. The more fluent the translation, the more 
invisible the translator, and, presumably, the more visible the writer or 
meaning of the foreign text.15
This is the translation strategy Venuti calls “familiarizing” or “domesticating,” 
where the goal of the translation is to make the text seem as if it were written 
in the target language. By making her work seem invisible, the translator is 
giving the illusion of direct access to the author(s) of the original text. If it 
reads “fluently” in this sense, the translation seems natural, and so less 
obviously a translation. This, according to Venuti, has been the governing 
standard of translation into English for the last several hundred years.16
However, Venuti argues that this practice is at best naïve and at worst 
“symptomatic of a complacency in Anglo-American relations with cultural 
others, a complacency that can be described—without too much exaggeration—
as imperialistic abroad and xenophobic at home.”17 That is, by making 
something written in classical Chinese seem too at ease in contemporary 
American English, it not only suggests that “our” language is the language of 
the world, but also that nothing else is really terribly different from how “we” 
think.
Venuti draws on an 1813 lecture by Friedrich Schleiermacher, in which he 
argues that there are primarily two methods of translation—a domesticating 
method that is inherently ethnocentric and reduces the foreign text to target 
language cultural values, and a foreignizing method, “an ethnodeviant 
pressure on those values to register the linguistic and cultural difference of 
the foreign text, sending the reader abroad”—and that the choice of which 
to use is ethically significant. Schleiermacher argues for the foreignizing 
method, and others since have argued that the translated text should be a 
place where the cultural other is allowed to manifest, although always 
through the medium of the target language.18 Venuti takes this up as a call for 
using translation to disrupt and resist target language cultural values and 
codes. “In its effort to do right abroad, this translation method must do 
wrong at home, deviating enough from native norms to stage an alien reading 
experience—choosing to translate a foreign text excluded by domestic 
literary canons, for instance, or using a marginal discourse to translate it.”19 
This, he argues, is not a simple valorization of the foreign as foreign, but 
a strategic move against ethnocentrism, racism, cultural imperialism, and 
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narcissism. The goal, then, is a political goal, to develop translation practices 
that signify the genuine difference of the foreign text, while still maintaining 
the possibility of real inter- cultural understanding—that is, this goal is 
political, but in service of, and indeed perhaps required for, a more genuine 
understanding of the other.
This strategy of resistancy or foreignizing is not immune from the troubles 
that plague other translations—it too is committed to a particular 
interpretation of and orientation toward the text—but translators who 
employ this kind of strategy tend to be more upfront with their partiality. 
The very idea of resisting invisibility and fluency as translation values requires 
a somewhat more elaborate explanatory framework and explicitness about 
the project of translation on the part of the translator. But, choosing this 
kind of method enacts the text as what Venuti calls “a locus of difference, 
instead of the homogeneity that widely characterizes it today.”20
There are several ways that I see the project of Confucian role ethics as 
using this kind of resistant or foreignizing methodology. First, the charge 
given by Venuti—to read and write translated texts in ways that recognize 
and valorize linguistic and cultural difference—is at least parallel to the 
overarching concern of CRE as an interpretive project attempting to let the 
Chinese tradition speak for itself.21 Henry Rosemont Jr. writes of the project 
of Confucian role ethics that it is part of a larger project attempting to ask 
the question, what makes Chinese thought Chinese? and “what is the cluster 
of concepts within the early Chinese canons that on their own terms give full 
expression to this notion of Confucian role Ethics”?22 That is, how can we 
understand Chinese philosophy broadly, and ethics more specifically, in the 
distinctively Chinese ways that it has emerged. This requires active strategies 
to resist asymmetrical reductionism. Ames and Rosemont here follow Zhang 
in giving explicit attention to the differences between Chinese and English 
(or Western languages more broadly), not only in terms of vocabulary but in 
the ways in which grammatical structures and metaphysical concerns are co- 
influencing.
Second, while many contemporary interpreters of Confucianism broadly 
and Confucian ethics in particular will draw on traditionally accepted 
translations for key terms, even while sometimes acknowledging certain 
problems or issues with them, CRE is explicit about the connection between 
interpretation and translation such that regardless of the general acceptability 
of a given term for translation, if it carries a problematic interpretive 
connotation, it requires reworking. Ames’ recent monograph has many 
examples of this, including retranslations and extensive discussions of key 
terms, for example xing 性 (commonly translated as human nature, there 
translated as natural human tendencies).23
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Third, Venuti notes that a translation that values resistancy and foreignizing 
methods tends to “value experimentation, tampers with usage, and seeks to 
match the polyvalencies or plurivocities or expressive stresses of the original 
by producing its own.”24 These three characteristics are certainly present in 
CRE. Consider here the descriptions of ren as a kind of moral artistry and 
the use of the language of aesthetics in making sense of ethics.25 This is in 
part a way of experimenting, altering common usage, and producing parallel 
kinds of expressions to make good sense of the original in the new language 
and context.
Finally, the concern that motivates much of Venuti’s project is a concern 
with cultural imperialism and ethnocentricism, and the ways in which those 
are produced and reproduced through projects of translation. This concern 
is visibly present in the interpretive framework of CRE as attempting to 
carve out a space for Confucian ethics alongside other ethical theories, rather 
than subsumed under a western theory.26 All translations and interpretations 
are products of a particular context, and that context is purposeful. Part 
of the judgment of the value of a given translation/interpretation needs 
to concern how well it matches with its contextual purpose.27 So, part of 
thinking through how to make sense of Confucian ethics, and how to translate 
given terms and phrases, needs to involve the more meta- questions of context, 
purpose, and audience.
INTERPRETING
Translation and interpretation are inseparable. There is no translation into a 
bare, uninterpreted space, and no interpretation from another language that 
does not privilege certain translations over others. Hans-Georg Gadamer, 
the twentieth century giant of hermeneutics, once famously argued that one 
of the serious problems we face, coming out of Enlightenment thinking, is 
that we have a real prejudice against prejudices. As Jean Grondin explains: 
“Gadamer is so reluctant to renounce the ideal of a critical elucidation of 
prejudices that he himself criticizes a Cartesian prejudice: the prejudice 
against prejudices! The expression, ingenious, presupposes that there are 
prejudices prejudicial to the understanding and that the prejudices against 
prejudices is part of it.”28
That is, we tend to think that there is a way to understand something 
without having any preconceptions, expectations, or anticipations. From an 
hermeneutic perspective, this is impossible. Whether it be language, culture, 
history, time, location, society, personal idiosyncrasies, or some combination 
thereof, we all begin engagements of understanding within a landscape and 
a horizon of our own. The interpretive challenge, then, is not to get ourselves 
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into outer space, as it were, but to attempt to carefully refine the prejudices 
we do have so as to be the most responsible to the tradition in question as 
possible.
The interpretive methodology of Confucian role ethics begins from this 
sort of hermeneutic perspective. Given that unfettered access is at best an 
illusion and at worst a dangerous distortion, a primary component of 
Confucian ethics is attempting to articulate the relevant ambient cultural 
assumptions at work in the formative period of Confucianism.29 This 
work was started in large part by twentieth century comparativist Zhang 
Dongsun, whose pioneering work in comparative epistemology and cultural 
philosophy locates many of these discussions in his attempts to articulate his 
own cultural, linguistic, and philosophical heritage, in light of increasing 
dominance of western concepts.30 That is, the over- arching concern with 
ambient cultural assumptions is one that is located in a concern with accuracy 
and precision in interpretation—what is required to give the best possible 
account of the tradition on its own terms in another language and cultural 
context?31
As I see it, Confucian role ethics operates with (at least) eight interconnected 
interpretive techniques:
1. Attend to language, cultural evidence, and texts and commentaries from 
related fields (such as the Yijing 易經, the early medical texts, etc.) to 
articulate cultural assumptions, especially those that differ from contemporary 
Western ones.
In specific terms, for CRE this means a focus on correlative or qi 氣 
cosmology.32 When taken to the level of persons, correlative cosmology 
entails the idea of relational personhood, where personal identity is 
understood first and foremost as relationally constituted.33 CRE also argues, 
in this vein, that the processual nature of Classical Chinese language and the 
immanent cosmology (not metaphysics) lends itself to being understood as 
lacking certain common dualisms present in the west such as mind/body, 
reason/emotion, God/man, human/nature, and so on. Many CRE interpreters 
have also argued, following Zhang and Ames, against the idea of a strong 
notion of philosophical transcendence in early China.34
2. Highlight relevant differences.
Beginning with Zhang Dongsun and continuing through other twentieth 
century figures such as A.C. Graham, CRE takes difference, and especially 
differences between cultures, to be a central interpretive concern. One 
difference often highlighted by Ames and others is cosmological: “There can 
be no superordinate and independent ‘one’ in this ecological cosmology, 
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no single cause, no grounding, foundational standard, no one privileged 
order.”35 Any interpretive strategy has to identify the appropriate audience, 
and given that audience, figure out what to emphasize. In this case, since the 
audience is primarily a contemporary audience (although not an exclusively 
Western audience), given the tendencies toward reductionism and asymmetry 
present in the field, setting a context where genuine differences are identified 
not only helps to avoid reductionism and asymmetry, but allows for 
Confucianism to make more of a distinctive contribution to the field.36 This 
is contrasted, for instance, with the interpretive strategy found in William de 
Bary’s book, Confucian Tradition and Global Education (2007), where he 
suggests that students, in order to generate interest, should read Chinese 
classics and look for what is familiar first. Although an interpretation can 
focus too much on difference, and head its readers toward incommensurability, 
CRE attempts to avoid that problem through explicit concerns with 
comparison.
3. Use careful generalizations and retail analogies.
Many contemporary comparativists and non-Western philosophers have 
argued for the need for careful generalizations across different traditions. 
Chenyang Li calls these “cultural patterns” and suggests that as long as they 
are used provisionally, carefully, and with appropriate context, they are 
crucial in contemporary philosophizing.37 Cultural patterns are probabilistic, 
not universal, and not only admit of exceptions but also admit of change 
over time. He further suggests that the presence of cultural patterns makes 
generalizations necessary, but that the fact of needing generalizations does 
not privilege any one interpretation over another. Ames describes these as 
informed generalizations, and argues at length that they are a necessary part 
of doing comparative work.38 Furthermore, he argues that we need to use 
retail (as opposed to wholesale) analogies in order to create temporary 
bridges between ideas.39
4. Draw on a wide variety of sources.
CRE thinkers often draw on a wide variety of sources, from more traditional 
early commentaries in China to twentieth- century Chinese intellectuals, 
from American pragmatists to Chinese sociologists. This catholic resourcing 
is somewhat unusual, but it provides a number of different avenues of 
approach to the material, many of which are being drawn from Chinese 
sources. This is important, because as Aaron Creller has noted, we have a 
responsibility to try to “de- orientalize” our perspectives, and one of the ways 
to do this is to look for “local” interpretive bridges to play a more central 
role.40 So, for instance, looking to a twentieth century Chinese philosopher 
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such as Zhang Dongsun as a bridge person between classical China and the 
contemporary West not only provides valuable insights but also helps to 
correct against the tendency for Western sources to occupy the center. Or, 
looking at classical medical treatises might give insight into how early 
Chinese philosophers were understanding the body, which may provide 
insight into practices of ethical cultivation.
5. Re- orient readers by retranslating terms and providing extensive glossaries 
and explanations of vocabulary.
As discussed earlier, translation and interpretation are deeply intertwined, 
and interpretation needs to be sensitive to issues of translation. As most are 
aware, many common translations of Chinese philosophical terms were first 
coined by Jesuit missionaries. These missionaries were often high caliber 
scholars doing revolutionary work, often with the aid of Chinese scholars 
who have received little historical credit for their contributions. However, 
their work was in the context of conversion, and that context colors many 
of their translations. In addition, just because a term has inertia as a 
translation, or is in the Mandarin/English dictionary, does not make it the 
best philosophical translation. While translations do need to be anchored in 
the original text, bringing attention to how we use words and what they 
mean is an important interpretive project.
6. Attempt to draw out what is distinctly Chinese, but not impossibly foreign.
As mentioned earlier, CRE interpreters tend to begin an interpretation with 
an emphasis on difference. This emphasis on difference can sometimes go 
too far and lead to issues of incommensurability. However, it can also go too 
far in the other direction, and lead to problems of relativism. Being able to 
make cultural generalizations does not entail relativism, but rather a kind of 
cultural pluralism. Paying attention to what is distinctly Chinese does not 
imply either that there are no standards that can be shared across traditions 
or that the distinctive features apply only and ever to Chinese people. The 
project of CRE is committed to taking Confucian ethics seriously, meaning 
that this interpretation sees Confucianism as having genuine contributions to 
make to a world conversation about how to live well. Ames writes, “I would 
contend that it is precisely the recognition and appreciation of the degree of 
difference obtaining among cultures in living and thinking that properly 
motivates cultural translation in the first place, and that ultimately rewards 
the effort.”41 That is, we are not presented with only two options, universalism 
or relativism. We have a middle ground that recognizes the value of difference 
in the context of seeking understanding and wisdom in how to live here 
and now.
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7. Highlight the political.
It is especially with respect to this interpretive tool that CRE can be seen as 
doing something different from some contemporary projects that look to 
Confucian ethics as a species of Virtue Ethics, or Care Ethics, or Deontology. 
Paying explicit attention to the political dimensions of and context for an 
interpretation is a central concern of CRE. This, however, does not detract 
from the quality of the interpretation. Just as Berthold Brecht once remarked 
that the only non- political art is the art of the ruling class, so too the only 
“non- political” interpretation is one that is already situated in a place of 
interpretive power, which in this case is likely the Western canon.
As this is an interpretive tool, it also has specific standards with it that do 
not entail this being the only interpretation that is explicitly political. For 
instance, Bryan Van Norden’s interpretation of Confucianism as Virtue 
Ethics in Virtue Ethics and Consequentialism in Early Chinese Philosophy is 
a good example of a careful interpretation that is explicitly trying to deal 
with problems of ethnocentrism. yong Huang’s recent book, Why be Moral: 
Learning from the Neo-Confucian Cheng Brothers, is also explicitly political, 
but in a different direction, aiming at getting the attention of mainstream 
western (analytic) philosophers. CRE is not the only political interpretation 
of Confucian ethics, but it does take this political dimension to be relevant, 
especially in meta- concerns of interpretation and translation.
8. Give as genuine and accurate an account as possible.
That is, while Ames in particular is often described as doing what Stalnaker 
calls “creative, emblematic generalization” or what Kwong- loi Shun calls 
“philosophical construction,” both of which imply some sense of movement 
away from the classical texts and toward the personage of the interpreter, 
CRE is attempting to give a genuine and accurate account of how we 
might understand Confucian ethics today.42 This is a philosophical project, 
and not in some sense an historical project, so the emphasis is not on 
how Confucianism worked out as a political ideology in the Han, for 
instance, but nonetheless it does not seem to understand itself as departing 
from the tradition. It tends to employ the common Confucian hermeneutic 
strategy of “return to the classics” and through commentary be original and 
contribute to the lineage. This is a strategy at play in most later Confucian 
scholars.
The contrast here might be with something like Kupperman’s Character 
Ethics, which owes a significant debt to Confucianism but is not in particular 
claiming to be a species of Confucian ethics. This is unlike Peimin Ni’s 
Gongfu Ethics, which like Confucian role ethics is trying to carve out its own 
space in contemporary ethical discourse as a distinctly Chinese/Confucian 
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ethical project. CRE, then, is not trying to articulate a view inspired by 
Confucianism, but rather is giving an articulation of Confucianism.
CONCLUSION
I would like to conclude with some critical and hopefully constructive 
remarks about Confucian role ethics. There are some critical engagements 
with CRE that have already been well raised. Ames himself brings up several 
critical concerns in the epilogue to the monograph; he considers problems 
like justice, impartiality, and corruption, and the need for something like 
regulative ideas in CRE. I have elsewhere argued that CRE could benefit 
from a more robust feminist orientation, and Stephen Angle raised interesting 
questions about the normative force of role ethics and the grounding of 
commitments to interdependence and relationality in his 2014 chapter on 
the Analects. In a book symposium in Frontiers of Philosophy in China, 
scholars critiqued Ames’ monograph and CRE along a number of different 
avenues, from May Sim’s engagement with his translation and parsing of 
ren to Daniel Bell’s questions about the nature of community in role ethics, 
from WEN Haiming’s concern with connotations of “role” ethics in 
contemporary Chinese language to ZHANG xianglong’s issues with Ames’ 
discussion of xiao. While there are many interesting critical avenues to 
pursue, as this chapter has mainly focused not on detail issues with particular 
translations or interpretations, but with bigger picture questions, that is 
where I will conclude.
By far the most common critical perspective on CRE has come from other 
interpreters who are interested in Confucian Virtue Ethics. While critiques 
may be implicit or explicit, a focus on virtue is often seen as suggesting 
that a focus on role is incorrect, and vice versa. I actually do not find this 
to be particularly compelling—often discussions of Confucian Virtue Ethics 
do much to enhance and complicate virtue ethics, and in some cases the 
vocabulary of virtue can be useful for thinking through Confucianism, 
especially with regards to particular thinkers or passages. These interpretations 
are not aimed at the same goal, and so do not need, in particular, to be in 
conflict. That said, Ames and others are also occasionally critical of the idea 
of Confucian Virtue Ethics, as tending to reduce notions of self and principles 
to western ideas in ways that they find contrary to the early Confucian texts.
One common complaint about CRE is that role ethics is, in fact, already 
a present category in Western ethics. Some discussions of business or other 
professional ethics have used the term “role” to describe the particular 
obligations one might have as a doctor, for instance, that do not apply 
outside of that role. As a central part of the argument for this interpretation 
35287.indb   38 23/10/2018   14:18
CONFUCIAN ROLE ETHICS 39
is that it is trying to take Confucian ethics on its own terms, and on equal 
footing with other Western and non-Western ethical theories, the fact that 
something called role ethics already exists would seem to be a serious issue. 
However, I think there are a couple of reasons why this is not that big of a 
problem. First, the argument is not that Confucian ethics is a species of 
professional ethics, but that “role” is a useful term for the emphasis of 
Confucian ethics. If we were prevented from ever using any terms already 
used, philosophical discourse would be brief indeed. Second, although the 
term does exist in Western ethics, that does not mean it necessarily has 
priority in determining how the category will be used moving forward. 
Finally, there are several serious differences between Confucian role ethics 
and role ethics as found in professional ethics. The role ethics found in 
professional ethics does not constitute its own theory, but tends to rely on a 
theoretical framework from a more established position (virtue, utility, 
deontology, etc.) to resolve its problems. So, while “role ethics” may mark 
out a specific discourse, it is not the same discourse nor is it operating on the 
same theoretical level as CRE.
Ames in particular is also occasionally accused of being “post- modern,” 
where the context makes it clear that this is a bad thing. I think when this is 
used, critics are concerned that there is not a tight enough relationship 
between theory and text. Whether or not that is a fair concern is a topic for 
another day. I would actually suggest that in as much as Ames and other CRE 
interpreters are post- modern, they are perhaps not post- modern enough, 
and could go further to incorporate post- colonial, feminist, and other post- 
modern insights into the interpretive frame. Given the concern with 
foreignizing translation, for example, why are we still saying “ethics” and 
“Confucius” and not using the Chinese? Why translate at all? For instance, 
if a major concern is setting up the conditions for the tradition to speak on 
its own terms, why not attempt to “properly name” Confucian role ethics 
儒家角色倫理學 (rujia juese lunlixue), and attune the ears of English speakers 
to the Chinese? Or at least drop the “Confucian” and call it “Ruist” role 
ethics, as some scholars have already done? Or why include the “role,” and 
not just call it Confucian/Ruist ethics?
I think the answer to this is not only an answer provided by Confucian 
role ethics, but by most contemporary engagements, be they through virtue 
ethics, care ethics, or another name. Part of the process of zhengming entails 
attention to the circumstances surrounding the present moment, and the 
circumstances of the present moment are encouraging a conversation 
involving Chinese philosophy generally and Confucian ethics specifically, in 
the English- speaking philosophical world. This is a purely pragmatic concern, 
and one that many hope will fade as mainstream English language philosophy 
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becomes less Eurocentric. Calling Confucius “Kongzi,” for instance, is a 
small change, but one that does help to circumvent certain problematic 
historical issues. The trouble is that non- specialists who are familiar at all 
with Confucius do not recognize “Kongzi.” So, this is a strategy that will 
take time and effort on the part of specialists to educate non- specialists.
However, this actually presents another concern. Even if mainstream 
English language philosophers were willing, able, and sensitized to Chinese 
language, the phrase for “ethics” in Chinese is not historically how Confucian 
thinkers would have understood their projects. In Mandarin Chinese, 
“ethics,” in the technical sense used by philosophers, is lunlixue 伦理学. This 
phrase is one of many contemporary Chinese phrases borrowed from the 
Japanese, who created an entire lexicon of vocabulary during the Meiji 
Restoration, in an attempt to translate foreign technical terms into Japanese.
So even if one is concerned to use terms and categories internal to 
the tradition as resistance to Western imposition and centralization, as 
contemporary theorists such as Leah Kalmanson argue for, just borrowing 
the current Mandarin term is not enough.43 We have to dig into why the 
Meiji- era thinkers found lunlixue to be a good translation for ethics, and why 
contemporary Chinese speakers have continued to find this term appropriate. 
As something like “the study of the patterns and reasons of human 
relationships,” lunlixue has some overlap with contemporary connotations 
of “ethics,” and some genuine differences. One of the things it does is 
foreground this importance of human roles and relationships (lun). If, as 
Ames and others suggest, a Confucian conception of ethics takes a different 
direction than common western ethical theories, then naming Confucian 
ethics something that highlights this overlap, but also gives attention to a 
central difference, makes sense. We can do more with this by bringing 
concepts, ideas, and vocabulary from traditions like Confucianism (Ruism) 
into contemporary western discourse, so that we can, for instance, ask after 
a Socratic li 禮, a Cartesian xin 心, or Iris Murdoch’s account of xiao 孝. In 
a sense, this is a complement to the foreignizing translation strategy—not 
only to choose less familiar translations or leave fewer terms untranslated 
and require extensive glosses, but to de- center the field by advocating a 
plurality of vocabulary.
Finally, I would like to end by suggesting that CRE is not the end of the 
discussion. CRE is an heuristic category, a provisional and useful way of 
approaching and engaging Confucian ethics in the current philosophical 
landscape. Saying that CRE is valuable does not entail that thinking about 
Confucian ethics in terms of virtue or care is not useful, or that Confucianism 
does not have something particularly valuable to contribute to those 
conversations. But, contributing to those conversations and carving out a 
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space for itself are different projects, and require different discourses. As 
scholars concerned with the lack of diverse resources in contemporary 
conversations about ethics, we should celebrate Confucian role ethics and 
other interpretations of non- western traditions that are finding a home and 
a place to grow and develop in contemporary ethical discourse and as 
resources for enriching how we might live well together.
NOTES
1. Stephen Angle, “The Analects and Moral Theory,” in Dao Companion to the 
Analects, ed. Amy Olberding (New york: Springer Press, 2014), 225.
2. Roger Ames, Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary (Honolulu: University of 
Hawai‘i Press, 2011), 2.
3. Kam-Por yu, Julia Tao, and Philip J. Ivanhoe, “Why Take Confucian Ethics 
Seriously,” in Taking Confucian Ethics Seriously: Contemporary Theories and 
Applications (Albany, Ny: SUNy Press, 2011), 1.
4. As far as I am able to ascertain, the first use of the phrase Confucian Role Ethics 
is in a dissertation, “An Ethic of Loving: Ethical Particularism and the Engaged 
Perspective in Confucian Role-Ethics,” by Sin yee Chan, out of the University of 
Michigan in 1993. However, this does not appear connected to the later use of 
the term by Ames and Rosemont. Angle describes the first use of this by them  
in print in 2009, although earlier references exist to “role- bearing persons” in 
Confucian ethics by Ames and Rosemont (Angle, 2014). Also, apparently 
unconnected, A.T. Nuyen has published on Confucian Role Ethics (2007), 
although, again, not meaning the same thing as Ames and Rosemont. And, 
while Zhang Dongsun did not use the phrase “Confucian Role Ethics” there is 
clearly a significant similarity in content between his work and Ames and 
Rosemont’s, and this is a debt they acknowledge.
5. Sarah Mattice, “Confucian Role Ethics in the 21st Century: Domestic Violence, 
Same- sex Marriage, and Christian Family Values,” in Feminist Encounters with 
Confucius, eds. Sor- hoon Tan and Mathew Foust (Leiden: Brill, 2016).
6. I say here “Confucian traditions” because Confucianism is not a monolithic 
tradition, but admits of much variety and difference across historical periods 
and geographical locations.
7. Ames 2011, 85.
8. Analects 12.11.
9. Sarah Mattice, “On ‘Rectifying’ Rectification: Reconsidering Zhengming in 
Light of Confucian Role Ethics,” Asian Philosophy, 20.3 (2010): 247–60, 254.
10. Analects 13.3, my translation and paraphrase.
11. Mattice 2010, 257.
12. Ames 2011, 98.
13. For more on this from Zhang, see xinyan Jiang’s “Pluralist Epistemology and 
Chinese Philosophy”, p. 29, and Zhang, Knoweldge and Culture (Shanghai: 
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Commercial Press 1946), 75. Zhang specifically used the phrase “metaphysics” 
to refer to doctrines asserting the existence and primacy of substance.
14. Lawrence Venuti, The Translator’s Invisibility: A History of Translation (New 
york: Routledge Press, 2008), 24, 34, 36. To be clear, to my knowledge neither 
Ames nor any of the other proponents of CRE use Venuti or this kind of 
argument to justify the project.
15. Venuti 2008, 1.
16. Venuti himself is primarily focused on literature, but there is no reason his 
comments here could not also apply to philosophical works.
17. Venuti 2008, 17.
18. Ibid., 19–20.
19. Ibid., 20.
20. Ibid., 42.
21. Ibid., 41.
22. Ames 2011, xvi, paraphrasing from Henry Rosemont Jr.’s 1991 chapter, 
“Rights- bearing Individuals and Role- bearing Persons” in Rules, Rituals, and 
Responsibility: Chapters Dedicated to Herbert Fingarette, ed. Mary I. Bockover 
(La Salle, IL: Open Court Press, 1991).
23. Ames 2011, 73, 128–34.
24. Phillip Lewis, “The Measure of Translation Effects,” in Difference in 
Translation, ed. J. Graham, 1985, quoted in Venuti 2008, 24.
25. See for instance Ames 2011, 171 and 189.
26. To be clear, this doesn’t mean that projects attempting to draw out similarities 
between Confucian ethics and a Western ethical tradition are necessarily 
ethnocentric.
27. This is true of part of the value of a translation, but it is not the entirety of 
value. Other translation standards are still relevant, and this does not imply that 
anything goes, or that translations do not need to be anchored in texts and time 
periods.
28. Jean Grondin, The Philosophy of Gadamer, trans. Kathryn Plant (Ithaca: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2003), 84.
29. Again, this differs from other interpretive projects due in part to purpose. For 
instance, in Bryan Van Norden’s Virtue Ethics and Consequentialism in Early 
Chinese Philosophy (2012), instead of trying to articulate ambient cultural 
assumptions, he is focused explicitly on drawing out arguments from the text.
30. Although not much of his work is available in translation, see Jiang 2014 for a 
translation of selected works and a commentary chapter on Zhang.
31. Contemporary China and Mandarin Chinese are also, in a sense, another 
language and context, also clearly closer in many regards than English and 
contemporary America as cultural contexts.
32. See chapter two of Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary for a discussion of 
correlative cosmology as it relates to the Yijing, to Traditional Chinese 
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Medicine, and to the work of Tang Junyi. See chapter three of Confucian Role 
Ethics: A Vocabulary, for a discussion of relational personhood, especially 
III.13.
33. For an excellent discussion of what this means, without the language of 
“relational personhood,” see the end of chapter two of yong Huang’s Why Be 
Moral, 2014.
34. Many of these ideas can be found in Zhang’s work, although not under the 
name “Confucian Role Ethics.”
35. Ames 2011, 72.
36. For more on this idea of asymmetry, see Kwong Loi-Shun’s chapter, “Studying 
Confucian and Comparative Ethics: Methodological Reflections” in the Journal 
of Chinese Philosophy 36 (3): 455–78 (2009).
37. Chenyang Li, “Capacities and Purposes of Comparative Philosophy,” special 
panel on How to Do Chinese and Comparative Philosophy I: Methodology, 
ACPA, APA Eastern Division Meeting, January 2016.
38. See Ames 2011, 20–35.
39. Many contemporary theorists have slightly different accounts of what these 
analogies look like. For instance, Aaron Stalnaker calls them “bridge concepts” 
and argues that they can form loose focal points for comparative work. See 
Aaron Stalnaker Overcoming Our Evil: Human Nature and Spiritual Exercises 
in Xunzi and Augustine (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press), 2006.
40. Aaron Creller, “De-Orienting Comparative Philosophy: Approaching the  
‘West’ From China,” presented at the APA Eastern Division Meeting, January 
2016.
41. Ames 2011, 32.
42. Stalnaker 2006, 15–16; Shun 2009, 267–8.
43. Leah Kalmanson, “Annotating the Self: The Ritual Methods of Comparative 
Philosophy,” Philosophy East and West Vol. 67, No. 3 (2017).
WORKS CITED
Ames, Roger. Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary. Honolulu: University of 
Hawai‘i Press, 2011.
Angle, Stephen. “The Analects and Moral Theory,” in Dao Companion to the 
Analects, ed. Amy Olberding. New york: Springer Press, 2014.
Bell, Daniel. “A Comment on Confucian Role Ethics,” in Frontiers of Philosophy in 
China 7.4 (2012): 626–31.
Grondin, Jean. The Philosophy of Gadamer, trans. Kathryn Plant. Ithaca: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 2003.
Jiang, xinyan. “Pluralist Epistemology and Chinese Philosophy,” in Knowledge, 
Culture, and Chinese Philosophy: A Study and Translation of Zhang Dongsun’s 
Works. New york: Global Scholarly Publications, 2014.
Kalmanson, Leah. “Annotating the Self: The Ritual Methods of Comparative 
Philosophy.” Philosophy East and West 67.3 (2017).
35287.indb   43 23/10/2018   14:18
44 EARLy CHINESE ETHICS AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHy
Huang, yong. Why Be Moral? Learning from the Neo-Confucian Cheng Brothers. 
Albany, Ny: SUNy Press, 2014.
Li, Chenyang. “The Confucian Concept of Jen and the Feminist Ethics of Care: 
A Comparative Study” in Hypatia 9.1 (1994): 70–89.
Mattice, Sarah. “Confucian Ethics in the Twenty-First Century”, Frontiers of 
Philosophy in China, 7.4 (2012): 632–7.
Mattice, Sarah. “Confucian Role Ethics in the 21st Century: Domestic Violence, 
Same- sex Marriage, and Christian Family Values,” in Feminist Encounters with 
Confucius. Ed. Sor- hoon Tan and Mathew Foust. Brill Press, 2016.
Mattice, Sarah. “On ‘Rectifying’ Rectification: Reconsidering Zhengming in Light of 
Confucian Role Ethics,” Asian Philosophy 20.3 (2010): 247–60.
Nuyen, A.T. “Moral Obligation and Moral Motivation in Confucian Role-Based 
Ethics.” Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 8.1 (2009): 1–11.
Ramsey, John. “The Role Dilemma in Early Confucianism.” Frontiers of Philosophy 
in China 8.3 (2013): 376–87.
Rosemont, Henry Jr. “Rights- bearing Individuals and Role- bearing Persons” in 
Rules, Rituals, and Responsibility: Chapters Dedicated to Herbert Fingarette, ed. 
Mary I. Bockover, La Salle, IL: Open Court Press, 1991.
Shun, Kwong Loi. “Studying Confucian and Comparative Ethics: Methodological 
Reflections” in the Journal of Chinese Philosophy 36.3 (2009):455–78.
Sim, May. “Review of Roger Ames’ Confucian Role Ethics,” Frontiers of Philosophy 
in China, 7.4 (2012): 638–43.
Stalnaker, Aaron. Overcoming Our Evil: Human Nature and Spiritual Exercises in 
Xunzi and Augustine, Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2006.
Van Norden, Bryan. Virtue Ethics and Consequentialism in Early Chinese 
Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
yu, Kam-Por, Julia Tao, and Philip J. Ivanhoe, “Why Take Confucian Ethics 
Seriously,” Taking Confucian Ethics Seriously: Contemporary Theories and 
Applications. Albany, Ny: SUNy Press, 2011.
Venuti, Lawrence. The Translator’s Invisibility: A History of Translation. New york: 
Routledge Press, 2008.
Wen Haiming. “Confucian Role Ethics in Chinese- and English-Language 
Contexts,” Frontiers of Philosophy in China, 7.4 (2012): 649–56.
Zhang Dongsun. Zhishi yu Wenhua 知識與文化 (Knowledge and Culture), 
Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1946.
Zhang xiaolong. “Time in Familial Reverence-Deference (孝): A Comment on 
Roger T. Ames’ Confucian Role Ethics”, Frontiers of Philosophy in China, 7.4 
(2012): 657–61.
35287.indb   44 23/10/2018   14:18
